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Blockchain Quantum Readiness Index

Blockchain Quantum Readiness Index / Avalanche C-Chain

UCPBAM

L1 · EVM

Avalanche C-Chain

Nothing on the C-Chain is post-quantum yet: accounts and validators sign with elliptic-curve keys, and the official cross-chain transfers rely on elliptic-curve validator signatures. The only plan is a community proposal for a staged transition, and its pull request was closed unmerged.

Stage 0Not started
8/100progress index · 100% researched · 75% in scope

Last reviewed 2026-10-19

Is Avalanche C-Chain quantum safe?

Not yet. Avalanche C-Chain is at Stage 0 (Not started) in LimeChain's Blockchain Quantum Readiness Index, with a progress score of 8/100. Post-quantum accounts have only been discussed, so users have no way to keep funds out of a quantum attacker's reach. Still exposed or unproven: bridges & messaging.

Exposed (0 pts)Unknown (scored as exposed)Discussed / plannedIn development / testnetLive (hybrid or PQ)Not applicable

What Avalanche C-Chain needs for Stage 1: Committed

  • Stage 1 needs an official roadmap or accepted spec for PQ user accounts (U is: discussed)

Caps and adjustments

  • cap 40: users cannot hold and spend funds under a production PQ mechanism on mainnet
  • cap 60: consensus PQ not even on testnet

Rosette slices

SliceState PointsWeightReason & evidence
U User keysDiscussed
At rest: Hidden until first spend
C-Chain addresses are Ethereum-style: the last 20 bytes of keccak256 of the secp256k1 public key. An EOA that never sent a transaction has no public key on-chain until its first ECDSA-signed transaction. (X/P-Chain addresses are likewise ripemd160(sha256(pubkey)).) EOAs cannot rotate keys.
Sources 23
1/1025 Hybrid ECDSA+Falcon/ML-DSA accounts and Falcon/Dilithium precompiles exist only as a community ACP idea; PR #278 was closed unmerged (checked 2026-10-12).
Sources 1
C ConsensusDiscussed 1/1020 A hybrid validator signature model is proposed in the same community idea. Today block proposals are signed with RSA/ECDSA staking-certificate keys and Warp messages with BLS.
Sources 1
P Proof systemNot applicable —— L1 without a validity or fraud proof system.
no evidence
B Bridges & messagingExposed 0/1015 Canonical interop (ICM/ICTT) runs on Avalanche Warp Messaging, which verifies an aggregate BLS12-381 multi-signature of the source chain's validators; no PQ alternative is shipped.
Sources 45
A Admin & upgrade keysNot applicable —— No admin or upgrade keys: ACPs activate via coordinated AvalancheGo releases, and the C-Chain is embedded in the node (Coreth), not governed by upgradeable admin contracts.
Sources 67
M Migration & recoveryDiscussed 1/1015 Staged migration only described in the community proposal.
Sources 1

Stage gates

RequirementStatusDetails & evidence
Current audit of the deployed PQ signing code (Stage 5)Not met
not claimed
Admin timelock of at least 30 days with a PQ override (Stage 6, alternative to PQ admin keys)Not met
not claimed
Ratified migration plan with an activation date (Stage 6)Not met
not claimed
New accounts PQ or hybrid by default (Stage 6)Not met
not claimed
ECC sunset enforced (Stage 7)Not met
not claimed

PQ adoption published, not scored

There are no PQ accounts on mainnet yet. Having PQ accounts does not mean people move to them. This tracks the share of value and accounts that actually moved, over time.

Measured exposure published, not scored

Only recently active addresses are sampled, so on account chains almost every sampled key is already revealed. The score will use this once a full-state snapshot exists.

100%of value in regular accounts (EOAs) has its public key on-chain
0%of sampled value is in contracts (admin-key exposure)
50addresses from the last 15 blocks

Native value by account class

Account classAddressesNative balanceShare
EOA, key revealed291,283,889100.00%
EIP-7702 delegated EOA00.000.00%
EOA, key not revealed10.500.00%
Contract2010.580.00%

Pinned at block 96,781,027, hash 0x0c3590c4150cb37ac0cba3752ebf605399e99180c28ea184c934a98bdacbc9cf, RPC https://api.avax.network/ext/bc/C/rpc. Method: active-address sample (biased toward revealed keys); native asset only. 0 RPC errors.

Evidence and sources (7)

Every non-zero rating above cites at least one of these public sources.
  1. github.com/avalanche-foundation/ACPs/pull/278
  2. support.avax.network/en/articles/4596397-what-is-an-address
  3. build.avax.network/docs/rpcs/other/standards/cryptographic-pr…
  4. build.avax.network/docs/cross-chain/avalanche-warp-messaging/…
  5. build.avax.network/docs/acps/118-warp-signature-request.md
  6. build.avax.network/docs/acps.md
  7. build.avax.network/docs/nodes/releases.md

Source: chains/avalanche-c.json. Reproduce: python3 score.py chains/avalanche-c.json

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Open, repeatable scoring. Non-zero ratings need public evidence; missing evidence means unknown. Methodology v0.4 · mechanism registry 2026-10-13.